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Abstract
The modest early stage impact of slow-moving threats makes it easy to underestimate their 
impact. These threats grow and evolve unnoticed until reaching dramatic impacts in both scope 
and scale. Since slow-moving threats can grow to catastrophic magnitudes that threaten our 
very survival, they are more aptly identified as ‘stealth threats’. The geographic range of stealth 
threats combined with their impact across multiple sectors impose potentially existential costs 
to the Nation. As such, we must re-focus the mission of DHS to identify and combat stealth 
threats. When dealing with stealth threats, there is no instinctive approach that can relate 
the facts of today to the consequences of tomorrow. Preparing for, and responding to, stealth 
threats requires a commitment to validated science-based models that predict the impact of 
the threat. We illustrate these points, and the role of mathematical modeling in emergency 
response, using the SIR growth model of epidemics applied to Covid-19.
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Introduction
The Coronavirus pandemic makes clear that natural catastrophes present a much larger threat 
than non-state terrorism.  Furthermore, our response is hamstrung by both social-media 
disinformation as well as the ‘slow moving’ nature of these threats.  In a report from the United 
Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction Staupe-Delgado1 elaborated upon six key features of 
slow-moving threats, reproduced here:
1. Early warning technologies do not necessarily secure proactive response to slow-onset 
disasters due to political and practical obstacles in the way of timely action. 
2. Generic all-hazards DRR strategies, while best practice in the context of sudden-onset 
disasters, are generally inappropriate for the management of slow-onset disasters.
3. Slow-onset disasters often fall outside the mandate of specialized disaster management 
agencies.
4. The geographically dispersed nature of slow-onset disaster impacts reduces their 
perceived severity and political salience.
5. The concept of disaster is often equated with sudden-onset disasters.
6. The vast majority of disaster research and theory revolves around sudden-onset 
disasters, generally the largest and most destructive historical events. 
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The slowly emergent nature of such threats makes them less urgent to the general public.  As a 
result, threats emerge and grow outside the priority-box of prevention planning until reaching 
a tipping point of exponential risk. The magnitude of consequence posed by these slow-moving 
threats requires a name commensurate with the consequences, which is why I propose the more 
insidious label of ‘stealth threats’.   This characteristic of modest early stage impact makes it easy 
to underestimate the catastrophic nature of stealth threats. Our collective lack of action, described 
by Robert Gifford (Gifford, 2011)2 as ‘The Dragons of Inaction,” is rooted in psychological barriers to 
slow moving threats. Put simply, our evolution programmed us to respond to threats of immediate 
impact.  Yet, though we have progressed beyond an environment that presents daily threats to life, 
we have not adjusted our threat- mentality.  Since stealth threats can grow, if unchecked, to tipping 
points of enormous magnitude3, we must re-focus the mission of DHS to identify and combat these 
emerging threats.   These are the so-called ‘fat tail’ or Black Swan events discussed by Talib.4  The 
geographic range of stealth threats combined with their impact across multiple sectors imposes 
potentially existential costs to the Nation.
Certain natural hazards, such as pandemics, disinformation, mass migrations, food and water 
shortages, and climate change, are compounded by the inherent delay time between the onset 
of the threat and the experience of significant consequences.  It is because these hazards lack 
an immediately significant consequence that they engender a false sense of security.  Worse, 
the lack of immediate consequence subjects many of these threats to outright dismissal: think 
climate change as well as the current pandemic.  A large number of social-media postings, news 
reports, radio personalities and government officials have deemed both climate change and the 
Coronavirus a hoax.  In the case of Coronavirus, the disinformation is so pervasive to have earned it 
a special name: “infodemic.” 5  This disinformation landscape makes it especially difficult to mount 
a proper response.    If there is anything to be learned from the Coronavirus pandemic it is that 
planning and response must be based in science and believed by the public.  There is no instinctive 
approach that can relate the facts of today to the consequences of tomorrow.   Preparing for, and 
responding to, emerging stealth threats requires a science-based approach that builds predictive 
models of the phenomenon.  These models rely on fundamental physics, chemistry, and biology to 
generate predictions of the future.  Such models are analogous to weather forecasting, a complex 
science that enjoys widespread public support.  Weather models predict the future using complex 
computer simulations rooted in sophisticated mathematical models, presented using forecast 
graphics that are easy to understand and widely acceptable.  Analogous efforts are underway in 
the current pandemic, but have failed to achieve the same level of public support.
Even though nearly every aspect of our modern society depends upon scientific principles to 
enable their function, Barry, Han and McGinty6 report that nearly half of the U.S. adult population 
does not trust science.  Yet, two of the keys to emergency response are7: 1) identify potential 
emergencies and, 2) develop a plan.  Clearly, this requires forecasting, which is the science of 
predicting future events.  The most broadly applicable tool for this is Systems Dynamics8, a field 
of study created by Jay Forester in the 1950s9. Anyone interested in developing sound models to 
predict the outcomes of response policies should read Forester. The goal of the present article is 
to introduce the reader to this field using the example of a systems dynamics model applied to the 
Coronavirus pandemic.
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Mathematical models of epidemic growth can be used to demonstrate the broader utility of 
model-based predictions for emergency response planning.  From the emergency response 
perspective, it is important to note that these models do not have to be 100% accurate to be 
useful as a planning tool.  All they must do is predict the proper course of events and establish 
worst-case outcomes to enable staging and preparation.   For the reader interested in a 
comprehensive overview of a broad range of epidemic models, see, for instance, Chowel, et. al.10 
From the planner’s perspective, the well-established SIR model11 offers a sufficiently predictive 
method to show how the growth of a pandemic is affected by stay-at-home orders, the wearing 
of masks, vaccinations and quarantine.  Armed with these models, planners can make informed 
decisions concerning opening and closure plans to manage the load on medical facilities while 
buying time to develop treatments and vaccines. 
The SIR model, Figure 1, includes three key components: (1) The population of individuals who 
are susceptible to infection, S; (2) The number of infected people, I that are circulating among the 
susceptible population, and (3) those who are removed from the population, R, either through 
death or recovery from the illness.  Each of these populations is represented by a circle in Figure 
1 where each circle represents a bucket that holds the number of individuals in each category.  At 
the start of the epidemic, the population is not infected and resides entirely in the S-bucket.  We 
begin the model by introducing an infected individual into the susceptible population, then use 
the related equations to predict how the number of infections will grow over time.  Though this 
is a rather simple approach to modeling the growth of infections, it works remarkably well.  The 
graphic, alone, provides a simple visual way to understand how the epidemic is influenced by the 
size of the population and the numbers of infected and recovered individuals.
Figure 1: The simple SIR model consists of three basic populations: the population of people susceptible to the  
virus, S, the number of infected people, I, and the number who have either recovered or died, R. Changes in the  
numbers in each category are represented by the equations below each circle.
The fundamental problem of epidemiology is to understand how the populations in the S, I 
and R buckets are changing over time.  The rate at which these numbers change is indicated 
by , where the dot above the symbol indicates a rate of change.  Since we generally 
compile and report daily cases, all of these changes are daily rates of change. In an epidemic, 
people move from the susceptible bin, S, to the infected bin, I, and finally to the removed bin, 
R.  To predict the number of people in each category, we must know the probability of catching 
the disease when exposed to an infected individual, , and the probability of recovery from 
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the disease after being infected, b, as well as the total size of the starting population, N.   The 
parameters b and b  calibrate the model to the current pathogen.  The equations below each bin 
in Figure 1 are the standard equations for the SIR model.
Using this simple model, we can calculate the number of infections over time for a particular 
population, N, if you can measure the transmissivity, , and the recovery term, b.   This is where 
the model needs data so one can determine these important parameters.  As such, we can’t run 
predictive models in the first weeks of a pandemic because we need to measure the number of 
infections as well as the number of people who have recovered or died.    In models calibrated 
by the author, the South Korean data was used to fit the SIR model to the measured number of 
infections, allowing an experimental measure of the parameters  and b.  Figure 2 shows the 
resulting SIR model predictions for the United States, using  and b from South Korea, and starting 
the model with 1 infected person on January 20th of 2020.  It is important to state that these 
model predictions presume that no mitigation measures would be taken to control the spread, 
representing the case of free spreading of the infection.  It is also worth noting that these results 
were calculated using an Excel spreadsheet, a program that is readily available to any and all 
responders/emergency planners.  The initial runs of the SIR model predicted 2.16 million deaths, 
consistent with the 2.2 million deaths predicted by the Ferguson group at Imperial College12.  
Far from being wrong, these jaw dropping numbers motivated the lockdowns that successfully 
suppressed the number of infections.  Unfortunately, rather than cheering this success, certain 
public figures maligned the models as unhinged warnings that the sky was falling.
Figure 2: The SIR model allows calculation of daily infection and mortality numbers.
Aside from numbers, though, a good basic model provides a clear understanding of how one 
can manage epidemics.  It does so by offering a prediction of the future based upon current 
conditions.  If you can lower the transmissivity, , you will reduce the number of people who 
become infected.  The vectors of infection include touch transfer to the nose, eyes and mouth 
or through inhaling virus-laden respiratory droplets.  To avoid touch transmission through 
fingers to face, we wash our hands.  To prevent inhaling virus we must avoid sharing breathable 
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air with infected people.  This means you either stay away from those who are infected (social 
distancing or self-quarantine) or you wear a mask that is capable of filtering out the respiratory 
droplets.  Outdoor interaction, if distanced, dilutes the concentration of potential virus by 
mixing respiratory droplets with large volumes of non-shared breathable air, reducing the 
need for masks.  We can show these effects by plotting the SIR model with different values of 
transmissivity (Beta=0.21, 0.10 and 0.08), Figure 3.  The model shows two important effects 
from decreasing transmissivity: first, the infection curve is pushed out in time and, second the 
maximum number of infections decreases.
Figure 3: decreasing transmissivity either by wearing a mask and/or social distancing reduces the peak.
We use the model to measure the effect of self-quarantine by reducing the size of the 
susceptible population, S.  Since this population is reduced, the number of potential infections 
is likewise reduced.  Again, the simple model captures the effect and allows us to model the 
results.  Figure 4 shows how a 60-day lock-down with 70% compliance changes the infection 
curve.  In this case, the lock-down was initiated on day 106 and kept in place for 60 days.  The 
black curve shows how the un-mitigated curve is ‘flattened’ with lock-down.   Notice, however, 
that when the lock down has ended and if there is still virus circulating, then the infections 
renew their aggressive growth, but to a lower peak number.  The models show that a lock-down 
is a temporary pause in epidemic growth intended to buy time for increasing preparedness and 
testing.  The minute it is lifted, the epidemic cycle starts anew.
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Figure 4: Lockdowns, black curve, flatten the curve during the duration of the lock down.
The single most effective method, short of vaccines, to limit epidemic growth is to identify 
and quarantine those who are infected.  The number of new infections per day is given by the 
following equation:
  (1)
In order for the infection to grow, we must have infected individuals circulating among the 
uninfected. If we were able to test and quarantine all infected people, I, we could keep them 
from circulating among the susceptible population, S.  In terms of the model, it means that I=0 
in Equation (1) and the number of newly infected people would then be zero.  That means we 
could stop entirely the growth of infections if we could test and identify every person who was 
infected.  This is what testing, contact tracing, and quarantine can accomplish and is precisely 
why so many countries have dramatically outperformed the United States.  Unfortunately, the 
U.S. has not adopted this approach as a national strategy and, until we do, absent a vaccine, we 
will lose the battle.
It is admittedly impossible to identify and quarantine all infected people.  However, we can 
explore how profound the effect is by simply looking at the model, with an aggressive testing 
program that identifies and quarantines 10% of all infected individuals.  Results of such a model 
are shown in Figure 5, where a dramatic drop in the number of infections has occurred. The 
effectiveness of this approach is precisely why so many people have been pressing for testing…it 
allows us to identify and isolate infected individuals and remove them from circulation.
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Figure 5: Plot of infection curves comparing unmitigated (yellow) to quarantine of 10% of all infected individuals. 
Quarantine of infected individuals is a very effective approach to reducing the impact of a pandemic.
Conclusion
It is worth emphasizing that the goal of risk management is to predict the future.  This idea is not 
new or radical. We do this by understanding the science of the problem at hand and building 
models to predict future outcomes.  Those models inform prevention and response actions, 
based upon key parameters in the model, to mold the future into a more palatable outcome.  
If the actual numbers fall short of the predictions, we have likely implemented successful 
strategies to decrease the consequences.  It does not mean that the model is bad; it means that 
we have changed the inputs to the model and, therefore, changed the outputs.  This, too, is 
an important aspect of modeling and planning that must be communicated to the public.  The 
short of it is this: our citizens must believe in the actions we take and they must trust that those 
actions are in the public interest.  Over the next 20 years our nation will face a large number 
of stealth threats.  Identifying and planning for these threats is the precise wheelhouse of 
emergency management.  We need to carve out priorities for long-term, slow-moving threat 
management to avoid future disasters, and we must develop ways of communicating those 
plans and actions to the public using forecasting methods that they can trust.  In short, we 
must embark on a new effort to ensure scientific integrity and believability, speaking about it 
whenever possible to ensure public understanding.  Furthermore, we must assure that any of 
our short-term response actions do not derail long-term planning.
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